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The 2003 Tobriner Lecture
The Evolution of Equality
in American Law
by GERALD TORRES*
I appreciate that the title of this lecture is somewhat grandiose.
It was inspired by the prospect of having to comment on the Grutter
and Gratz decisions' before I knew what the results would be. As
should be obvious on a moment's reflection, there is no way that a
single lecture or a single book could capture the evolution of equality
in American law because, even in its presumption that there is a
single phenomenon that is being surveyed or analyzed, it is wrong.
What is more is that it was unlikely that the idea of equality would get
other than a provisional accounting in whatever the Court did in the
Michigan cases. Instead, the Justices would be responding to a
congeries of impulses hemmed in by doctrine and pushed by the
empirical reality of the American society and legal culture for which
they claim to speak.
The dynamic forces that shape the law are internal to both the
doctrinal and procedural structure of the law as well as external to the
law. The forces are internal in the sense that they are relatively
autonomous phenomena within the structure of legal analysis, and so
to treat the topic of equality in that way would require careful
attention to the doctrinal development across various substantive
areas. Moreover, it would have to explain that development in terms
of the logic that is implicit as well as explicit in the doctrine. Of
course, while doctrinal development has a logic derived from rule and
fact, it also has a logic derived from the structure and relationships
* H.O. Head Centennial Professor of Real Property Law, University of Texas at
Austin. Many of the themes in this lecture remain to be more fully developed.
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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that are constitutive of the particular area.
The forces are external to the extent that the law reflects, but
does not determine, the normative commitments that animate our
culture and society.2 As society and culture evolve, so must the law.
Thus any consideration of the evolution of the idea of equality in
American law is obliged necessarily to engage the cross currents in
American life to which the law has responded. Yet, because law is
also a relatively autonomous discipline there is never a pure legal
correlative to the changes in social life. The law is not some sort of
device for the universal translation of present felt necessities into
policy. Law contains the congealed imperatives of the past that live
on as precedent or tradition.' This characteristic of law acts as a
brake on precipitous social change either for good or for ill. Yet,
slavish devotion to conceptual purity as a methodological imperative
also enforces various kinds of blindness. The partiality of legal
doctrine, both in the sense that it is incomplete and biased, is part of
its definitional structure.
Let's start with the basic idea of equality that seems to be the
cornerstone of legal reasoning and the source of much confusion. It is
simply stated: likes should be treated alike. This formal idea of
equality is said to be traceable to Aristotle. By focusing on identity as
the sine qua non of equality it shifts the discussion immediately to
what it means to say X is like Y.5 Once shifted to that ground, then
the question of equality becomes the question that underlies all of
2. This is, of course, a paraphrase of Grant Gilmore (who was himself paraphrasing
Holmes). "Law reflects but in no sense determines the moral worth of a society. The
values of a reasonably just society will reflect themselves in a reasonably just law. The
better the society, the less law there will be. In Heaven there will be no law, and the lion
will lie down with the lamb. The values of an unjust society will reflect themselves in an
unjust law. The worse the society, the more law there will be. In Hell there will be nothing
but law, and due process will be meticulously observed." See, Gilmore, The Ages of
American Law 110 (1977). I remember hearing those words at Professor Gilmore's Storr's
Lectures on Jurisprudence when I was in my first semester of law school. They were, upon
my hearing them, etched indelibly in my memory.
3. See, Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation
of Law, 98 Yale L. J. 1631 (1989) ("temporality and legality are conceptually fused in the
West through their mutual implication of a total order in relation to which social life
acquires meaning.")
4. See, Catharine MacKinnon, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION. (1979). (See, especially chapter one).
5. See, e.g. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982).
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law: On what basis may we make the distinction between X and Y
such that any difference in treatment is justified? How is any legal
categorization justified? If X is like Y in all meaningful ways, it is
logically unsupportable to maintain any disparity in treatment before
the law.6 It is just this point that prompted the criticism Herbert
Wechsler launched at the Supreme Court's decisions in Brown v. Bd.
of Education.7 How, Wechsler asked, could the Court prefer the
rights of association of African Americans over the rights of
association of whites?8 In this case, the rights of X were identical to Y
and the constitutional command of equality required that they be
treated alike. Thus, the segregation decisions were unlawful because
they offended against that most basic idea in law. Worse, the
unlawfulness of the decision risked the currency of the Court by
undermining public faith in its neutrality.
In a towering rebuke to Professor Wechsler, Charles Black began
with the observation that if the cases were wrongly decided, that is, if
they were "unlawful," then dominant professional opinion would
finally result in their undoing.9 The institutions of law (and certainly
the elites within them) could not permit a patently unlawful decision
to stand because its illegitimacy would be too destabilizing. This
would not be a question of the Court merely being out of step with
popular opinion, but of their rejecting their fundamental obligations.
With this background of faith in the institutions of law, but because
he could not be blind to the limitations of law, Professor Black begins
not in the abstract ether of "rights of association," but with a concrete
question: "does segregation offend against equality?"'0  Professor
Black admits that equality as a general concept presents some
philosophical difficulties at the margins, but then suggests that the
segregation decisions do not present that kind of difficulty. He
observes:
6. In many ways this is the heart of the under-inclusive/over-inclusive dichotomy
proposed in the seminal article by Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 341 (1949).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
8. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1959).
9. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L. J.
421 (1960).
10. Id 424.
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But if a whole race of people finds itself confined within a
system which is set up and continued for the very purpose of
keeping it in an inferior station, and if the question is then
solemnly propounded whether such a race is being treated
"equally," I think we ought to exercise one of the sovereign
prerogatives of philosophers - that of laughter. The only
question remaining (after we get our laughter under control) is
whether the segregation system answers to this description.
Here, I must confess to a tendency to start laughing all over
again. I was raised in the South, in a Texas city where the pattern of
segregation was firmly fixed. I am sure it never occurred to anyone,
white or colored, to question its meaning. The fiction of "equality" is
just about on the level with the fiction of "finding" in the action of
trover."
But what of the reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that the
Supreme Court provided in The Slaughterhouse Cases?2 Professor
Black ably dispatches the crabbed and disingenuous mess that makes
up that opinion. 3 He argues persuasively that the Justices have it
almost exactly backwards and, like Professor Wechsler, turn a blind
eye to the facts upon which the law is built. But if the law as
expressed in opinions of the Supreme Court is not just the routine of
some stylized ventriloquist's dummy, aren't we confined to the
internal logic of precedent? Is Professor Black arguing that we can
reject doctrine merely because it does not comport with what we, who
are external to the case, think the facts are? Remember that at the
time of Professor Wechsler's article sound professional opinion was
with him. Among a great number of the elite as well as the bar
generally, Wechsler's argument was not considered unreasonable or a
mere apology for an inhumane system of racial subordination.
Fifteen years after the article was published, my classmates and I
were called upon in Constitutional Law class to puzzle through the
challenge posed by "Neutral Principles." I remember being
confounded because it seemed to me that the logic of Professor Black
(though we were not assigned his essay, it was not unknown to us)
had the better of the argument. If fact, only by being willfully blind
could the arguments against Brown raised by Professor Wechsler be
11. Id 424.
12.83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
13. Charles Black, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND
UNNAMED (1997).
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understood as principled.
If Professor Black's article was not enough to convince the
reader that Professor Wechsler's essay was, perhaps, well suited for
the armchair in a private club if not the hot streets of the American
South, Professor Deutsch persuasively demonstrated this in his
article, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some
Intersections Between Law and Political Science. 4 There he shows
that the goals that Wechsler was trying to achieve with his appeal to
neutrality were doomed to failure because of the institutional
function of the Supreme Court. Context mattered. I remember
thinking as I sat there in Constitutional Law class that the puzzle
posed by Professor Wechsler could not be that difficult. The problem
was that he was asking the wrong question. What Professors Black
and Deutsch demonstrated was that the institutional task of
constitutional adjudication was not reducible to a single abstract
question. As the philosopher G. E. Moore put it in a different
context, "they (philosophers) are constantly endeavoring to prove
that 'Yes' or 'No' will answer the question, to which neither answer is
correct, owing to the fact that what they have before their minds is
not one question, but several, to some of which the true answer is
'No,' to others, 'Yes.' ' '. Professor Wechsler could be right only if we
were to concede that his single abstract characterization of the issue
at stake represented the whole of the dispute to be settled by the
Supreme Court. But judges commonly know what Monday morning
quarterbacks do not, that the issues are often more complex, that an
issue or the composite of them is composed of more parts involving
more dynamics than the dry legal statement of them. 6 One of the
successes of common law judging (even in constitutional cases) is that
the flexibility to construct law that comports with reason requires an
exquisite sensitivity to the ways in which life and law interact. This
implies an acute understanding of the ways that institutions evolve
and function to structure social life, even as the law runs after them
plaintively asserting its priority.
Here I want to turn away from the large questions of equality in
constitutional adjudication and focus for a bit on the question of
14. 20 Stan. L. Rev. 169 (1969).
15. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica vii (1903).
16. See discussion of rules and precedent in Gerald Torres and Kathryn Milun,
Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 Duke
L. J. 625 (1990).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
adjudication itself.17 The mischaracterization of the task before
judges was as much at the heart of Professor Black and Professor
Deutsch's criticism as was their substantive disagreement with
Professor Wechsler's reading of the segregation decisions. It is in this
process of lawmaking, that is, reconciling law and life within the
argumentative constraints of legal reasoning, that the talent of
judging is most evident. A classic example of this that every first-year
law student encounters (assuming the case is not too savagely edited)
is Javins v. First National Realty Corporation.' There are many other
examples that teach the skills of legal reasoning that is at the heart of
our common law system. 9 The jurist in whose honor this lecture is
named was also one of those masters of the legal reasoning that was
rooted in producing a system of justice that took law on its own terms
and saw freedom rather than limitations.
The genius of Justice Tobriner was his skill at using the
techniques of common law judging to move the law in a way that
permitted it to be consonant with the underlying facts of social life.
As the arc of the law bent towards equality he recognized that this
would have an impact on all of the law. Contracts were no exception.
Justice, fairness, and equality before the law were all of a piece. So
we get Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York.2° Here the question
was relatively straightforward: should the beneficiary of a flight
insurance contract be able to collect on the policy when the facts that
led to the accidental death of the policyholder were, arguably,
excluded by the contract? The flight insurance was purchased at a
vending machine in the airport and covered travel on regularly
scheduled flights. Before the Mr. Steven's trip could be completed he
encountered flight difficulty and a leg of his return flight was
cancelled. Because he was eager to make a connecting flight in order
to return home, the airline arranged an air-taxi to take Mr. Steven
and two others to Chicago where they could make their connections.
17. Of course, the short hand description that I have given here does not begin to be
adequate to even outline the modalities of constitutional interpretation within
constitutional adjudication. For a brilliant and elegant discussion see, Philip Chase
Bobbitt, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
18. 428 F.2d 1071 (C.A.D.C. 1970) (Establishing an implied warranty of habitability
as a defense to an action for rent.)
19. Legal historian Morton Horwitz demonstrates this point in his seminal book, The
Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (1977).
20. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 58 Cal.2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27
Cal.Rptr. 172 (Cal. 1962).
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Fate intervened, the plane crashed and Mr. Steven was killed. The
insurance company refused to pay on the contract because the crash
occurred on a substituted segment that was not part of a regularly
scheduled flight. The rote application of contract principle might
have led Justice Tobriner to resolve the case simply in favor of the
insurance company.
Instead, Justice Tobriner asked whether the contract
contemplated covering substituted transportation. The language of
the contract on this point was unclear, but it seemed to be covered by
the language excluding coverage for non-scheduled flights. That
would seem to have settled the matter, but instead Justice Tobriner
began with an assessment of what the reasonable expectations of the
parties might have been. Because the principles he was being asked
to apply covered a different category of transactions, they might not
be and could not be reasonably applied to the purchasing of a
machine- issued fight insurance policy. The key to his analysis was his
willingness to see beyond the abstract categories of the parties and
instead to look to the fundamental nature of the transaction. The
expectations that ought to be enforced should be those that comport
with the social positions occupied by the parties, which were reflected
in the context within which the transaction occurred.
Once Justice Tobriner made that critical move it became clear
that the insurance company could not disclaim liability merely by
taking shelter in a doctrine confected out of language that would be
literally invisible to the purchaser." Yet even if Mr. Steven had the
opportunity to read and digest the policy, Justice Tobriner reasoned
that the exclusion would not apply to this case. Even admitting that
the substituted transportation was not part of a "regularly scheduled"
flight, it was, by virtue of arrangements made by the airline, part of a
regularly scheduled flight. At a minimum it represented an
accommodation that might reasonably be made by the airline in
satisfaction of their obligation to provide a round trip.
Since there was nothing out of the ordinary, except perhaps an
extraordinary expression of a commitment to customer service, the
substituted transportation would have to be understood as part of the
trip that was covered by the vending-machine insurance policy. This
was perhaps especially true because the substituted transportation did
21. The clause limiting liability was still in the machine and thus could not have been
read by Mr. Steven even if he had wanted to and if he had been able to understand the
import of the language. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 58 Cal.2d 862, 877;
377 P.2d 284 294; 27 Cal.Rptr. 172, 182 (Cal. 1962).
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not increase the risk borne by the insurance company. Thus, in
solving the puzzle of the applicability of one verbal formulation or
another, Justice Tobriner resisted resorting to easy conclusions and
focused on the underlying policy for which the formulations acted as
mere synecdoche. This is most plainly seen in Justice Tobriner's own
words. Thus you might excuse the lengthy quotation:
The rule of resolving ambiguities against the insurer does not
serve as a mere tie-breaker; it rests upon fundamental
considerations of policy. In view of the somewhat fictional
nature of intent in standardized contracts, the considerations
which support the rule that ambiguities in the policy are to be
interpreted against the insurer are more compelling that those
which prompt the application of the mechanical expressio unius
maxim. We do not believe the maxim should serve to defeat
the basic rule that the insurance contract should be interpreted
against the draftsman.
In any event, the maxim of expressio unius, which is surely a
legalistic concept, hardly enters into the thinking of the
reasonable layman. As we have stated, we interpret an
insurance contract in the light of that understanding. We could
not logically conclude that when Mr. Steven, unversed in legal
abstractions, boarded the Turner plane at Terre Haute, he• • 22
invoked this maxim of interpretation.
In standardized contracts, such as the instant one, which are
made by parties of unequal bargaining strength, the California
courts have long been disinclined to effectuate clauses of
limitation of liability which are unclear, unexpected,
inconspicuous or unconscionable. The attitude of the courts has
23been manifested in many areas of contract.
The task of the judiciary is to administer the spirit as well as the
letter of the law. On issues such as the present one, part of that
burden is to protect the ordinary man against the loss of
important rights through what, in effect, is the unilateral act of
the manufacturer. * * * From the standpoint of the purchaser,
there can be no arms length negotiating on the subject.
Because his capacity for bargaining is too grossly unequal, the
22 Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 58 Cal.2d 862, 871; 377 P.2d 284, 290;
27 Cal.Rptr. 172 178 (Cal. 1962).
23. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 58 Cal.2d 862, 879; 377 P.2d 284,
295;27 Cal.Rptr. 172 183 (Cal. 1962).
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inexorable conclusion which follows is that he is not permitted
to bargain at all. * * * 'Basically, the reason a contracting party
offering services of a public or quasi-public nature has been
held to the requirements of fair dealing, and, when it attempts
to limit its liability, of securing the understanding consent of the
patron or consumer, is because members of the public generally
have no other means of fulfilling the specific need represented
by the contract. * * * 24
This opinion was a signal event in the evolution of mass
commercial relations in California. Yet it was Justice Tobriner doing
no more than was suggested by Professor Black in his evaluation of
the segregation opinions and in his critique of The Slaughterhouse
Cases. Justice Tobriner did for contracts what Judge Wright did for
urban residential landlord-tenant relations. But what about other
issues of the day? I began by suggesting that the impending decisions
in Grutter and Gratz were the reason for the topic of this lecture.25
But before these cases there was Bakke.26
Virtually everyone remembers this tortured Supreme Court case
and the diversity rationale proposed by Justice Powell that was
ultimately upheld by the Court in the Michigan cases. In his critical
and decisive opinion Justice Powell was persuaded that "the
atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment, and creation' - so essential
to the quality of higher education - is widely believed to be promoted
by a diverse student body. 27  Almost none of the commentators,
however, reflect on the dissent by Justice Tobriner in the preceding
California Supreme Court decision.28 All of the virtues that were on
display in the Steven case were also evident in this dissent. More than
just an expression of technical virtuosity, however, the dissent was
also an example of Justice Tobriner's profound breadth of historical
vision and moral courage. I want to be clear here that what I mean by
moral courage is not the simple and cheap sentiment that confuses
24. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 58 Cal.2d 862, 883; 377 P.2d 284,
297;27 Cal.Rptr. 172 185 (Cal. 1962). (Internal quotations omitted.)
25. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
26. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
27. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
28. Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132
Cal. Rptr. 680 (Ca. 1976) (Tobriner, J. dissenting at 18 Cal. 3d 34, 64, 553 P.2d 1152, 1172,
132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 700 (Ca. 1976).
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moral argument with legal argument, and I am not attributing to his
dissent virtues that are born out of my agreement with the
preferences that Justice Tobriner would write into the text of the
Constitution. Professor Bobbitt makes this point this way: "there is
no warrant to read the moral preferences of judges - or anyone else -
into the constitutional decisions of governments no matter how
pleasing this might sometimes be."29  By moral courage, I am
suggesting that what Justice Tobriner did in his dissent was to ask
what the constitution permitted (and perhaps required in some
instances) and whether there was constitutional justification for the
governmental decision that the Regents took. Finding that there was
justification, he could have ended his inquiry there. He extends his
dissent because he challenges the majority, and asserts through legal
argument that they are doing exactly what Professor Bobbitt suggests
they have no warrant to do.
While he would, undoubtedly, have gone further than the Court
did in the Michigan cases, Justice Tobriner anticipated much of the
analysis. In evaluating the use of predictors, he presciently notes that
concern with admission criteria occasioned by race-conscious
affirmative action is likely to raise deeper concerns about the use of
such predictors generally.
Indeed, the medical school's decision to deemphasize MCAT
scores and grade point averages for minorities is especially
reasonable and invulnerable to constitutional challenge in light
of numerous empirical studies which reveal that, among
qualified applicants, such academic credentials bear no
significant correlation to an individual's eventual achievement
in the medical profession. The finding of these studies are not
surprising when one considers all of the nonacademic qualities -
energy, compassion, empathy, dedication, dexterity, and the
like - which make for a 'successful' physician. As medical
school admissions officials themselves acknowledge, these studies
raise questions of the most serious order as to the propriety of the
continuing use of traditional admission criteria.
While such empirical data might well have justified a revamping
of the school's admission policies for all applicants, the medical
school cannot be said to have acted unreasonably or
unconstitutionally in deciding, perhaps as a first step, to decrease its
29. Philip Bobbitt, Foreword to Charles Black, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN
RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED xiv (1997).
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reliance on the traditional criteria with respect to applications from
disadvantaged minorities, who as a group had been so
disproportionately excluded by such criteria."
In this he suggests that the majority was asking the wrong
question and making the same mistake that Professor Wechsler made
in his criticism of the Brown opinion. The majority mistakes abstract
categories for the history of race relations in California. This mistake
leads them to ask the wrong question. It is impossible to get the right
answer if there is confusion about what the question to be answered
is.
In any event, however, limitations on the government's
authority to compel the use of benign racial classification are
entirely beside the point. Our question here is not whether the
Davis medical school can constitutionally be compelled to
establish benign racial classifications to remedy the
exclusionary result of its past admission policies, but rather
whether the Constitution forbids the medical school from
taking such remedial action on its own.3"
Once again Justice Tobriner illustrated the imaginative capacity
is integral to the process of adjudication. This is perhaps especially
true in constitutional adjudication. There, legal reasoning is best
characterized by creative attention to text, structure and history. In
this way, evolving doctrinal categories can be the places where we
square deep conflicts over the social contract that binds us together
and begin to heal the ragged edges of fundamental disagreements.
The important thing about Justice Tobriner's dissent is that he did not
mistake racial inequality as a "residual individual problem."
Moreover, he knew that a failure to confront its continuing
manifestations would prevent systemic injustices from being
addressed and would cripple the capacity for constitutional
democratic institutions to permit the kind of action that would build
on the best in our traditions that are rooted, despite all, in an
30. Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 84-85, 553 P.2d
1152, 1187, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 715 (Ca. 1976) (Tobriner, J. dissenting, footnotes omitted,
emphasis added).
31. Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 78, 553 P.2d 1152,
1182, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 710 (Ca. 1976) (Tobriner, J. dissenting).
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optimistic vision of the future. 2
That optimism is, of course, part of the American character, but
it should not be mistaken for uncritical belief in progress. Instead, it
is a belief in the capacity for democratic institutions to provide the
structure and space for a more just future to be built, and for real
conflicts about the nature of the good to be fought out in ways that
preserve the capacity for social cohesion. So where does this leave us
with Grutter and Gratz? In Texas our response to the blow that was
Hopwood33 was to fashion what came to be called the 10-percent plan.
Hopwood, you will recall, banned all race-conscious affirmative
action in university admissions and flatly rejected Powell's opinion in
Bakke. We are grateful that the Supreme Court repudiated the
crabbed reading of the commands of the equal protection clause
adopted by the 5th Circuit, yet the bracing effect of the ruling while it
remained the law led us to examine our goals and the means we had
adopted to achieve those ends. The 10-percent plan guaranteed
admission to the flagship state university campuses to all high school
graduates who graduated in the top 10 percent of their class. While
we were conscious that over-reliance on any single admissions
indicator was probably not a good idea, the house was on fire and we
grabbed a bucket. Yet despite its limitations it gave us insight into
how we had gotten lazy by an over-reliance on other predictors. We
had failed to see those students who could take advantage of a
university level education because of our reliance on a limited set of
tools that only gave us a particular kind of knowledge. This is the
insight Justice Tobriner noted a generation ago.
The knowledge we gained during our time in the wilderness has
proven useful even as we now contemplate reincorporating the kind
of race-consciousness permitted by the Michigan decisions. We have
learned that predictors of success are complex and the kind of
individualized admission process contemplated by the Court in
Grutter and Gratz will yield a truly diverse class.34 Yet the challenge
32. See the discussion of colorblindness in Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, THE
MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING
DEMOCRACY 32-66 (2002).
33. Hopwood v. University of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5' Cir. 1996).
34. For an example of what we have learned go to the University of Texas website
and look at the research undertaken by the admissions office. We were blessed to have
been led by a President who remained committed to serving the entire state even during
the immense pressure of the Hopwood years and by having Bruce Walker in charge of the
Admissions Office.
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of the Michigan cases was revealed in a recent study undertaken by
the Admission Office at the University of Texas. In a study of
classroom diversity the investigators discovered that the bulk of
classes offered each semester at the University of Texas had one or
fewer minority students.35 If claims for diversity are rooted in its
contribution to the educational process, then critical mass becomes
the central idea in the Michigan cases. Viewed through the lens of
educational goals we have much more to do to ensure a diverse
learning environment. The struggle over that idea has yet to be
joined. In many ways, it has yet to be understood as the grounds on
which educational reform will be contested. Professor Guinier
reminds us that there is no public sphere that is free from politics.
Law can mediate or pacify, but it does not eliminate the need to
understand the structure of the politics that surround resource
decisions, whether those decisions are public or private. Reading race
will help us understand what is at stake and what within our
institutions is dysfunctional. Importantly, learning to use the
diagnostic insights that race provides allow us to see where we are all
at risk. As Professor Guinier notes:
Race, *** reveals rather than produces the stress on institutional
resources that undermines the connection between education and
democracy, a connection that the Court in Grutter and Gratz
recognized as essential. Because race is inextricably intertwined
with every period in American history, from our founding as a
constitutional democracy to current patterns of private wealth
formation, it is a formidable diagnostic and sociological tool. Used
as a lens to peer beyond the pretense of the debate, race helps
detect the deeper issues confronting public institutions of higher
education.
Race is the thin but highly visible edge of the wedge at the
intersection of the value and scarcity of educational opportunity.
*** Flawed formulations of merit have failed to allocate scarce
educational opportunities in a manner that is consistent with
democratic values.36
By understanding the complex role that race has played in
35. http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/ClassroomDiversity96-03.pdf
36 Lani Guinier, Admission Rituals as Political Acts, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 120-121
(2003). (footnotes omitted)
626 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol.31:1
allowing us to see how our vision of equality has evolved, we can
better trace how our political and legal institutions function to serve
the complex goal of equality. By retreating from a simplistic idea of
equality as identity, we can begin to appreciate its complex nature
and ask the right questions about its connection to our ideas of justice
and the connection of our ideas of justice to our ideas of democracy.
We will see that the evolution of our idea of equality traces the
evolution of our idea of who we are.
